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ABSTRACT Measuring safety as an outcome variable within the ultra-safe civil aviation industry during periods of 
deliberate organizational change is a difficult, and often fruitless, task. Anticipating eroding safety processes, based 
on measuring nothing happening over time, does not adequately capture the true state of an evolving safe system, 
and this is particularly relevant for leaders and managers in a civil aviation industry responsible for maintaining and 
improving ultra-safe performance while simultaneously managing demanding strategic business goals. 
 
In this paper, I will look at the difficulties of measuring safety as an outcome measure in high reliability 
organizations (HROs) using the traditional measures of incident and accident reporting during periods of deliberate 
organizational change inspired by the results from a three-year longitudinal case study of the Norwegian Air 
Navigation Services provider - Avinor.  
 
I will first review the current safety literature relating to Safety Management Systems (SMSs) used in the civil 
aviation industry. I will then propose a more holistic model that shifts the focus from the traditional safety 
monitoring mechanisms of risk analysis and trial and error learning, to the natural interactivity within socio-technical 
systems as found in High Reliability Organizations.   
 
And finally, I will present a summary of the empirical results of an alternate methodology for measuring perceived 
changes in safety at the operational level as leading indicators of evolving safety at at the organizational level.  
  
KEY WORDS: Organizational change; Safety Management Systems; High Reliability Organizations; perceptions of 
safety  
 
Background 
 
This paper focuses primarily on the problem of measuring safety as an outcome variable in an 
ultra-safe civil aviation industry during periods of organizational change using traditional 
aviation safety metrics inspired by a three year longitudinal case study of the Norwegian Air 
Navigation Services provider – Avinor (Lofquist, 2008). The study focused on the effects of 
deliberate large-scale organizational change, also known as strategic change, on safety outcomes 
within one High Reliability Organization (HRO). The strategic change process observed was 
undertaken as part of a corporatization initiative of air navigation services in Norway by the 
Norwegian government, and was to be accomplished without causing any disruption in customer 
services, and while simultaneously maintaining or improving safety performance. However, early 
in the study it became increasingly clear that the traditional safety metrics of measuring incidents 
and accidents did not reflect the negative effects of change that were being observed within the 
organization at the individual and unit levels, or even after the deliberate change process had 
suddenly collapsed in December 2005 (Lofquist, 2008). And these observations were confirmed 
by the Norwegian Transportation Safety Board study (HSLB, 2005) where no changes in 
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traditional safety metrics were detected leading to the conclusion that safety was unaffected by 
the change processes, at least not in the short run.  
 
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to address the problem of 
measuring safety outcomes in ultra-safe, high-risk industries during deliberate organizational 
change processes using traditional safety metrics. I will argue that the problems encountered in 
measuring safety as an outcome measure using traditional metrics in the Avinor case can be 
generalized both to other organizations within the civil aviation industry, and to other high-risk 
industries (Lofquist, 2008). The second purpose of this paper is to propose an expanded 
integrated safety model based upon current Safety Management Systems (SMSs) already widely 
used within the civil aviation industry. This model depicts safety as an emergent property of a 
complex socio-technical system embedded within an organizational culture in three temporal 
phases that goes beyond traditional reactive measures, and gives a more robust picture of 
evolving organizational safety. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the spring of 2005, The Norwegian Ministry of Transport (NMT) received disturbing 
indications from several sources within the civil aviation industry that safety margins within the 
Norwegian air transport sector had been significantly reduced as a direct result of both strategic 
and incremental changes being implemented by many of the key actors within the civil aviation 
industry. In response to these warnings, the Norwegian Ministry of Transport instructed the 
Norwegian Accident Investigation Board (HSLB) to conduct a review of the civil aviation 
industry, and to report back on the state of safety within the evolving Norwegian Air Transport 
sector (NMT letter of 7 Oct 2004). In the final report, entitled “Safety in Norwegian Civil 
Aviation during Change Processes” (HSLB, 2005), the study concluded that safety levels within 
the air transport sector remained “high”, but the report also qualified this conclusion with the 
following disclaimer: 
 
“The generally high safety level, and the correspondingly low number of accidents 
and serious incidents, makes it difficult, if not impossible on a national level, to 
utilize accident statistics to ‘measure’ or prove that flight safety has become better 
or worse due to the prior years reorganization/changes. Research and experience 
from other countries show that eventual negative effects of flight safety-related 
consequences seldom materialize in the form of accidents for several years after 
changes are implemented. It is, therefore, necessary to use as a basis, other types of 
indicators to be able to evaluate how flight safety is evaluated.” (HSLB, p. 6)   
 
These findings were reassuring to many, and particularly to the politicians and the leaders within 
the aviation industry responsible for safe outcomes, but the report also left significant doubt as to 
the real state of safety in the aggregated civil aviation industry undergoing continuous change 
where signs of system stress had been receiving daily media focus. One area of particular concern 
revealed through the study was the perception by those most closely associated with safe 
operations, specifically the pilots and air traffic controllers, that air safety quality had been 
noticeably reduced over the previous 5-year period as a direct result of organizational changes 
within the industry (TØI Report 2005, p. 42). This observation, though not fully reflected in the 
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final findings of the HSLB report, raised questions as to the true state of safety in an aggregated 
civil aviation industry experiencing deliberate organizational change that had not yet 
demonstrated a measurable decrease in safety levels, at least not by using the traditional safety 
metrics of incident and accident reporting. This also leads us to ask the question, “is safety an 
outcome in itself, or is safety an emergent quality of a complex system producing desired 
outcomes that are safe?” If the latter is true, do traditional measures give us an accurate, 
complete and timely representation of safety as an emergent quality of a complex process during 
periods of strategic change?  
 
Corporatization 
 
Since the late 1960’s, there has been a gradual deliberate liberalization of the international civil 
aviation industry through an initiative known as corporatization. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) describes corporatization as “creating a legal entity outside the government 
to manage airports and/or air navigation services, either through a specific statute or under an 
existing general statute, such as company law. Normally, ownership of the corporation remains 
with the government. However, in a corporatized body, private sector participation is possible. It 
depends upon the provisions of the statute under which it is established and the policy of the 
government.” (ICAO, 2002: p. 3.). In short, corporatization is a systematic approach for the 
privatization or semi-privatization of national civil aviation activities within the international civil 
aviation industry. The specific goal of corporatization is to make national civil aviation activities 
more competitive and cost effective, while simultaneously maintaining and/or improving upon 
ultra-safe levels of flight operations. This has placed an increased burden on the organizational 
leaders and managers who find themselves responsible for managing a new strategic business 
model in a high-risk environment with potentially conflicting goals. These leaders must now 
balance highly visible and verifiable financial performance results with less visible, and even less 
quantifiable, safety outcomes in an ultra-safe civil aviation industry where incidents and 
accidents are rare by design. This often leads to conflicting organizational goals requiring leaders 
to make hard business choices that can directly impact safety outcomes, over time. An impact, 
that often does not necessarily manifest itself in the form of incidents and accidents until long 
after the changes have progressed to the state where safety margins can no longer ensure safe 
outcomes, and can lead to disaster. These disastrous consequences were alluded to in the HLSB 
report, but also observed in the Überlingen mid-air collision that took place on 1 July 2002 over 
the town of Überlingen, Germany (Johnson, 2004). 
 
Literature review 
 
Currently, much of the safety literature on high-risk environments is based on grounded theory 
from high-profile accident investigations (Perrow, 1984, Shrivastava, 1987; Weick, 
1993a.:1993b.; Vaughn, 1996; Snook, 2002; Gehman, 2003; Johnson, 2004) based on dramatic 
system failures where much of the emphasis is devoted to showing post facto the structural and 
behavioral causes and precursors of operating failure (La Porte 1996: p. 60). Bourrier (1998) 
argues that “too often, organizational analyses are carried out only after a catastrophe has 
occurred. While very interesting, this perspective has serious limitations and it is always easier 
to explain and reconstruct events after they have taken place” (P. 133). And the literature also 
reflects that there is a general lack of proactive safety theory derived from longitudinal case 
studies of “safety management systems in companies being subject to reorganization in the wide-
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open business environment”, and is described as “a black hole in research and literature” (Hale 
et al., 1998: p. 11). But this trend also seems to be changing as the concepts of High Reliability 
Organizations and Resilience Engineering begin to dig deeper into system approaches to safety 
management in high-risk industries where accidents are rare by design, but potentially disastrous 
(Rochlin et al., 1987; Roberts, 1990; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001:2006; 
Reason, 1997; Hollnagel, et al., 2006). These types of studies, in particular, are highly relevant 
for the ultra-safe civil aviation industry that continues to evolve in its attempt to corporatize, and 
provides a unique opportunity to observe, and to gain new knowledge from, change processes in 
high-risk environments that can have potentially devastating consequences, prior to an actual 
disaster.  
 
In the past, most studies in safety management have been conducted primarily by scientists in the 
fields of sociology, psychology and engineering, all with their own particular scientific 
paradigms, and all with their own specific approaches for defining and measuring safety and/or 
safety culture (Perrow, 1984, Shrivastava, 1987; Weick, 1993a.:1993b.; Vaughn, 1996; Snook, 
2002; Gehman, 2003; Johnson, 2004) but without a great deal of interactivity between academic 
groupings. These same academic disciplines have also been involved in studying safety system 
behavior based on multiple case studies that have introduced new safety concepts, such as: man-
made disasters (Turner, 1978), high reliability organizations (Rochlin et al., 1987; Roberts, 1990; 
Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001:2006 ), organizational accidents (Reason, 
1997), and resilience engineering (Hollnagel, et al., 2006). And although all of these academic 
contributions have increased our understanding of the underlying organizational dynamics of how 
safe systems contribute to unacceptable outcomes, all fall short of defining a true systems 
perspective for measuring safety as a process within high-risk industries that captures all of the 
essential parts of a robust operative safety management system. And this is particularly relevant 
when defining safety within an expanded strategic business context where safety is one, but not 
necessarily the only, priority affecting business decisions. Rasmussen (1994) has contributed with 
the notion of organizational drift towards accidents under economic competitive pressures. This 
describes the threat to safety outcomes in business settings, but leaves business leaders and 
managers responsible for managing these complex systems with little prescriptive guidance on 
how to design and support proactive management structures that can help detect and identify 
potentially unsafe conditions in their developmental phases. And, more importantly, how and 
when managers should take appropriate proactive corrective actions based on leading safety 
indicators that fall well outside of the traditional historical metrics of incident and accident 
reporting. And this is also true during periods of demanding deliberate organizational change 
within a complex and changing environment where developing latent conditions (Reason, 1990) 
might be masked by competing priorities. 
 
One problem for the civil aviation industry is the excessive focus upon incidents and accidents as 
extraordinary events. Perrow (1984), for example, studied the Three Mile Island accident and 
found that accidents in complex, socio-technical systems are in reality normal outcomes within 
design specifications that are often unanticipated due to system characteristics, such as, 
interactive complexity and tight coupling. This is considered an important point in that by being 
normal outcomes within a system’s design parameters, accidents are, in fact, just undesired 
outcomes from an otherwise properly functioning system. And though the consequences of such 
undesired and unexpected events are often dramatic, their causes are similar to non-dramatic, 
undesired events that could have developed into disaster but did not. This often leads to artificial 
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“fixes” based on detected errors in the form of rules and regulations that attempt to limit the 
danger, and potential adverse consequences of undesired system outcomes, without really fixing 
the process that allows the undesired outcome to occur in the first place.  
 
This requires an expanded focus on what constitutes a safe system that goes well beyond the 
overly simplistic elimination of “breakdowns and errors” (Amalberti, 2001), even when 
conceptual designs generate systems with high theoretical performance (p. 110). Turner (1978) 
showed us how some accidents are caused by sloppy management, and can be dealt with through 
different types of control, but that others are caused by disaster preconditions created by normally 
functioning managerial and technical systems through the formation of “incubation periods” 
(p.215.). This is also reflected in Reason’s (1997) accumulation of latent failures. Still other 
literature focuses on man-made disasters such as: Bhopal (Shrivastava, 1987), Three Mile Island 
(Perrow, 1984), the Tenerife air disaster (Weick, 1993a), the Challenger (Vaughn, 1996) and 
Columbia (Gehman, 2003) space shuttle accidents, the “friendly” downing of two Blackhawk 
helicopters (Snook, 2002), and the Überlingen mid-air collision (Johnson, 2004), where 
organizations play a significant contributing role leading to undesired outcomes.  The space 
shuttle accidents, in particular, demonstrate both the importance of organizational soft variables, 
such as organizational culture in safety outcomes, as well as, the difficulties in changing culture 
within socio-technical organizations over time (Gehman, 2003).  
 
Recently, there have been “a few studies which have started to use organizational learning theory 
to look at the introduction, development and integration of safety management systems but even 
these have, up to now, been very limited and have only occasionally taken a longitudinal 
perspective to explain how the change works and what aids or hinders it” (Hale et al., 1998: p. 
10). This is emphasised by Baram (1998) who states that “such deep organizational changes in a 
company which uses hazardous technology can reduce the effectiveness of its process safety 
management system unless the implications of change are consciously and carefully addressed” 
(p. 191).  
 
These studies indicate the need for a systems approach to studying safety management systems in 
high-risk industries that goes beyond trial and error learning (Weick, 1987), and actively 
integrates reactive, interactive and proactive safety measures from both organizational and 
individual perspectives. And by an overall systems perspective in civil aviation, I am referring 
specifically to a socio-technical system that is becoming increasingly business-oriented, and 
where the balance between human interaction and technical complexity is high. Weick (1987) 
describes the air traffic control system as a system that “seems to keep the human more actively in 
the loop of technology than is true for other systems in which reliability is a bigger problem, and 
where the air traffic controller uses qualities such as discretion, latitude, looseness, enactment, 
slack, improvisation and faith - work through human beings to increase reliability” (p. 122). This 
places a greater reliance upon human operational strengths and weaknesses, and is, in fact, the 
human contribution to resilience in overall system performance. 
 
So I argue that to achieve a genuine systems perspective on safety that looks at all of the 
respective parts of a safety management system, in context, all of the previously mentioned 
academic disciplines are essential in contributing to a holistic system safety understanding. But 
that is not enough, as we also need interaction and involvement from the system operators and 
business leaders and managers responsible for both system performance, and for safety outcomes 
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prior to undesired events. This requires a robust safety management system that is integrated into 
the overall strategic business objectives of an organization within an expanded industrial business 
context that can anticipate changes in an operative environment while balancing safety with 
economic goals. And, though the consequences of change have often been identified as 
significant contributing factors in accident investigations (Vaughn, 1996; Snook, 2002, Gehman, 
2003; Johnson, 2004), little of the safety literature focuses specifically upon how deliberate 
change, in particular, affects safety over time. And, more importantly, how organizational leaders 
responsible for making time-sensitive decisions based on conflicting organizational priorities 
should react to eroding safe systems prior to disastrous outcomes.  
 
 
Civil aviation as a complex “social-technical” system 
 
The safety literature for high-risk industries is dominated by studies involving large machine-
bureaucratic organizations, such as the nuclear power and chemical industries, often with a very 
considerable investment in sophisticated defense-in-depth management systems in safety and 
environment (Hale et al., 1998). Civil aviation, on the other hand, has generally received less 
focus, yet few industries can rival the growth, introduction of new technologies, and increase in 
complexity that the civil aviation industry has experienced over the past years, and will continue 
to experience in the future (Shin, 2005). The civil aviation industry can be described as a 
complex system of overlapping socio-technical systems embedded within a highly competitive 
business environment, where safety is a primary, but not the only, goal. This is particularly true 
as international air navigation service providers corporatize, and become more economically 
competitive and, correspondingly, more vulnerable to conflicts of prioritization in a changing 
business environment. But unlike the tightly coupled machine-bureaucratic systems described by 
Perrow (1994) that lead to normal accidents, the civil aviation industry can be characterized as a 
system that is highly complex but loosely coupled, and relies more heavily on human interaction 
than most machine-bureaucratic organizations, and is highly influenced by human variation. In 
fact, Weick goes so far as to say that “one striking property of air traffic control is that 
controllers are the technology” (1987: p. 120) meaning that human variation is essentially an 
integral part of both the system design and system performance. But there are also benefits in that 
humans are also flexible and can accommodate subtle environmental changes real-time, and can 
also detect latent conditions or failures (Reason, 1990) that develop gradually over time. Loose 
coupling within a complex system, similar to feed back with delay in system dynamics terms 
(Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000), increases the complexity in understanding how causal 
relationships interact and develop over time, and these complexities are often missed in mishap 
investigations that often focus on finding the most observable root causes. This is also true 
during periods of strategic change in dynamic environments where system outcomes are based on 
systems that have evolved away from the original system design but, either due to operator 
accommodation, regulation or built-in resilience, has not demonstrated measurable undesired 
safety outcomes using traditional metrics.  
 
And these causal relationships become even more complex and difficult to identify when 
examining over-lapping safety management systems where external actors can obscure or mask 
system deficiencies (Lofquist, 2008). The civil aviation industry is such an industry consisting of 
a system of interacting safety management systems, often described as High Reliability 
Organizations (Roberts, 1990; Schulman, 1993; Weick, et al., 1999) that provide overlapping 
 7 
safeguards that can both prevent, or contribute to, disaster. The so-called safety nets (Johnson 
2004) provided by these overlapping high reliability organizations, often lead to the development 
of latent conditions (Reason, 1984) that hide potential disaster in unexpected ways (Turner, 
1976). Many authors have recognized that small events, that are not necessarily complex in 
themselves, can link together to create disproportionate and disastrous effects (Weick, 1993a; 
Perrow, 1987; Vaughn, 1996; Reason, 1997).  
 
 
Measuring safety in civil aviation 
 
This leads us to the real problem. Providing a meaningful measure of safety based primarily on 
disastrous outcomes is a difficult task considering that the likelihood of a disastrous accident 
today is approaching an ultra-safe level where the risk of such an event is currently below one 
accident per million events (Amalberti, 2001, p. 111). However, focussing on disastrous events 
alone, places too much weight on the magnitude of the consequences, and precludes unintended 
outcomes that could have, but did not, produce such devastating consequences. This problem was 
probably best summed up by James Reason (1990) who stated that “safety is defined and 
measured more by its absence than its presence.” And this was also reflected in the findings of 
the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board (HSLB, 2005) in their study of the Norwegian civil 
aviation industry where growing concern over aviation safety were not reflected in measurable 
changes in traditional safety metrics during the timeframe studied. But measuring safety is 
elusive because it is a dynamic non-event where a stable outcome is produced more by constant 
change rather than continuous repetition (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Nothing to measure, at 
least by current industry metrics, equates to no change in safety, which is counterintuitive in a 
strategic change environment where there are many examples of organizational change 
contributing to a sudden, and often unexpected, system failure (Weick, 1993a, Vaughn, 1996; 
Gehman, 2003; Johnson, 2004). When accidents do occur, we have a measurable indication that 
things are not safe, but when nothing happens, or there is nothing to pay attention to (Weick, 
1987; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001), we do not know if this is due to properly functioning safety 
processes, or due to good fortune. One problem is the focus upon what organizations label as 
errors, which are often associated with visible or measurable non-acceptable consequences 
instead of what psychologists define as erroneous acts, whatever the consequences, or level at 
which they are detected or recovered (Amalberti, 2001). This subtle difference often masks the 
true state of an eroding system until defined unacceptable events occur, often with disastrous 
consequences.   
 
Safety in three phases  
 
I have argued that the traditional safety metrics for measuring safety in the civil aviation industry 
of reporting incidents and accidents, though important inputs, do not fully capture the true safety 
state of an evolving organization, or even the industry as a whole, and are, at best, lagging 
indicators. Svedung and Rasmussen (1996) describe errors and accidents as not particular, 
separable phenomena, but must be studied as being the effect of normal, adaptive behavior 
drifting toward the boundaries of acceptable performance. Amalberti (2001) argues that larger 
incident and accident databases do not increase accident prediction capability, and also points out 
that these databases have drifted away from the original intent of safety monitoring toward 
focusing on literary or technical causes of accidents (p. 113).  In addition, safety studies have 
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found that the quality of defining and reporting incidents and accidents vary both from 
organization-to-organization, but also between units within organizations based on organizational 
culture, so that these measures are often unreliable, or at least difficult to defend, statistically 
(Cabrera and Isla, 1998; Pidgeon, 1997).  
 
Instead, I propose that a more balanced approach to measuring safety in a complex system is 
represented by a safety management system that monitors safety as a process in three temporal 
phases embedded in an organizational culture. These phases, depicted in Figure 1, include: 
proactive, interactive and reactive mechanisms and measures that are both separated in time, and 
should include both endogenous and exogenous environmental factors. Such a system will 
include both leading and lagging indicators that are both quantitative and qualitative in nature, 
and include operator perceptions of evolving safety systems during change.  This will provide a 
more balanced view of a system’s true safety state at any given point in time and give 
organizational leaders leading indications from which to take proactive measures. This approach 
is also compatible with current safety management systems (SMS) already in place within most 
civil aviation-related organizations, but as evidenced in the Überlingen example, not necessarily 
functioning as an integrated system. Figure 1 below demonstrates these interrelated mechanisms: 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 here. (Integrated Safety Management Model) 
 
 
Proactive phase 
 
In the proactive phase, I refer to the mechanisms and measures utilized in system design, and re-
design, covering the inception, introduction and life of an operational system. Designed levels of 
performance are based upon a specific set of operational assumptions and limited by 
technological and economic realities that may or may not reflect actual system performance, 
overtime. But these discrepancies are often unknown prior to the system becoming operational, 
and it has been shown that system design can, in fact, contribute to accidents as either root 
causes, or as contributory factors (Kinnersley & Roelen, 2007). And, in any case, these 
operational assumptions will evolve over time requiring continual evaluation, modification and 
fine-tuning over the operative life of the system. And as pointed out by Hollnagel (2006) “in 
complex systems, performance is always a variable, both because of the variability of the 
environment and the variability of the constituent subsystems” (p. 12), and it is the interaction of 
these endogenous and exogenous variables that create a gap in expectation and actual 
performance. Yet, this performance variability is necessary if a joint cognitive system, meaning 
human-machine system or a socio-technical system, is to successfully cope with the complexity 
of the real world (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). In this respect, a systems approach to 
organizational design, which includes technical interconnectivity and human variation, is critical 
in designing, evaluating, maintaining, measuring, and re-designing safety processes in high-risk 
environments involving socio-technical systems. However, understanding the gap between 
desired performance and actual performance in a high-risk system cannot be accomplished by 
engineers alone, and requires an active interface between system designers and the system 
operators/managers in identifying these gaps. And I will argue that it is this active interface that is 
lacking in most safety management systems today, and is the area of focus for this study. 
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To achieve this active interface, there needs to be a robust, active learning exchange between 
designers, operators and system managers which are embedded within the organizational culture. 
This will ensure that the operators and managers are both knowledgeable about system design 
and expected performance parameters under defined operational constraints, as well as, the 
proper procedures for operating the system in practice, and reporting system discrepancies. This 
will also enable operators to properly identify system performance deviations or latent conditions 
(Reason, 1990) at an early stage of system development, and provide meaningful feedback for 
system correction, both in the interactive and reactive phases to be discussed in the following 
sections. This bridge between design and operations is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Some important proactive measures for system design and redesign already exist, but are applied 
in safety management systems with varying levels of success, and the value of these measures 
depends heavily upon organizational culture. Risk analysis is one area of significant value for 
evaluating safety potential during change processes, and is a cornerstone of civil aviation safety 
management systems. However, one weakness of risk analysis is that the process is sometimes 
haphazard and incomplete in its application, and administered inconsistently due to competitive 
organizational pressures. In addition, risk analysis methods rarely capture all potential undesired 
or secondary outcomes due to system complexity and are, therefore, incomplete. And, in any 
case, risk analysis is only valid under the assumptions that are used in the analysis and are 
vulnerable to system evolution.  
 
Interactive phase  
 
The interactive phase is in many respects the most critical phase for high-risk organizations and 
the area with the greatest potential contribution to improving safety outcomes, particularly during 
deliberate change processes. The interactive phase includes all of the mechanisms and measures 
required for the real-time operation, control and maintenance of the designed system, and where 
interactions are heavily affected by both the internal and external environments, and human 
variability. This is where designed system performance meets reality with potential devastating 
results (Weick, 1993a; Vaughn, 1996; Gehman, 2003; Johnson, 2004). In civil aviation, for 
example, this is an area of particular challenge due to variation in human performance and 
overlapping operative systems where external actors often determine, or influence, outcomes as 
demonstrated in the Überlingen mid-air collision. The interactive phase is also where the 
organizational leadership has the least direct control over real-time outcomes but where 
organizational structure (Schein, 1985: 1990); leadership commitment (Zohar, 1980), and 
organizational culture (Meyerson and Martin, 1987; Pidgeon, 1997) contribute to flexible 
decision making during unexpected outcomes. Accordingly, this is an area where leaders and 
managers can initiate proactive initiatives to minimize, or even remove, potential latent 
conditions before they develop into failures as illustrated in Figure 1 (solid arrow). The 
interactive phase is where deviations between expected system performance and real outcomes 
are directly observable in their formulation stages, and also where imperfections in system design 
are first detected. This is particularly important when systems evolve away from original system 
design, or where local initiatives potentially conflict with overall system performance. But it is 
also here where discrepancies and undesired outcomes must be dealt with on a real-time basis, 
based on education, training, understanding, and experience, and is largely affected by the 
organizational culture of the organization, and where operators and managers take local action to 
minimize any adverse affects to the system, and the organization (Rochlin et al., 1987).  
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The interactive phase depends upon a supportive organizational culture to achieve and sustain 
high levels of safety performance over time, and is where the High Reliability Organization 
school of thought makes a significant contribution. This is particularly true in promoting flexible 
line decision-making and effective organizational learning (Weick, 1987) based on historical 
factors in context (Rochlin et al., 1987). The interactive phase depends upon the level at which 
safety and performance-related issues are both noticed and acted upon prior to undesired events 
taking place as described in the concept of mindfulness (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006). And this also 
includes deviations that fall short of incident and accident reporting. However, Pidgeon argues 
that safety culture, at least in a safety climate context (Zohar, 1980), can be “critiqued as a 
reduction to a combination of administrative procedures and individual attitudes … which is 
critically missing the shared characteristic of social organization and culture” (Pidgeon, 1997: p. 
6). It is exactly this concept of shared characteristics of social organization that are most 
dominant in a High Reliability Organization (Rochlin et al, 1987; Roberts, 1990; Weick and 
Roberts, 1993). And high-risk organizations that do not limit the effects of undesired events 
cannot afford to learn by trial and error, where the consequences can be disastrous (Roberts, 
1990).  
 
Safety process measurement techniques in the interactive phase of a safety management system 
are relatively new, with varying levels of agreement on methods and effectiveness. The use of 
safety climate surveys as part of safety audits are gaining ground and becoming an important 
qualitative tool for evaluating changes in safety processes (Zohar, 1980, Ciavarelli, 2003). 
However, despite the relative lack of agreement of the value of these tools, it is clear that this is 
an area with tremendous potential for improving safety outcomes by detecting potential failures 
in their formative phase, or when systems evolve away for original design parameters. 
 
Reactive phase 
 
The reactive phase of an integrated safety system involves the mechanisms and measures for 
enabling organizational learning after an undesired event has occurred. This is often referred to as 
trial and error learning (Weick, 1987), and depending upon the potential consequences involved, 
is not acceptable in high-risk organizations where one error can collapse the system. System 
corrections, based on either individual or an accumulation of events, can either take the form of 
restrictive measures to prevent future occurrences of such events based on the current system 
(dashed arrow), or redesign of the system (solid arrow) to remove the potential problem. Both are 
depicted in Figure 1. Introduction of restrictive measures that do not remove the potential 
problem do not provide real safety improvements, and may only provide local improvement 
while causing adverse affects in other parts of the system. Initiatives that use trial and error 
learning to initiate real system changes (solid arrow) remove system errors permanently through 
system redesign, and provide real safety improvements. As mentioned earlier, the reactive portion 
of the model is the area of system performance that has traditionally received the most focus for 
academic studies, and will not be addressed further here. 
 
A summary of the theoretical contributions of High Reliability Organizations and Resilience 
Engineering to an integrated Safety Measurement Systems are reflected in Table 1 below:  
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Insert Table 1 here. (Theoretical contributions to safety management systems) 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The Avinor study was a three year longitudinal case study following a strategic change initiative 
called Take-Off 05.  In the study, I used a mixed-method approach to triangulate three separate 
quantitative and qualitative data sets administered over a two year period to take a closer look at 
the effects of change on perceptions of safety in the interactive phase of the Safety Management 
System Model described earlier. The data sets were taken at two distinct points in time (just 
before the Take-Off 05 change process was initiated and at the mid-point of the change 
implementation process), and was aggregated at two different levels (four embedded cases and 
the entire Air Traffic Controller/ATC Assistant population). The reasoning for choosing two 
levels of aggregation was to reduce potential bias effects in the final safety measurement model 
to be presented below.  
 
The first quantitative data set used in the study was a leadership questionnaire administered 
internally by Avinor at each of the four Air Traffic Control Centers (ATCCs) in Norway in 
December, 2002. This questionnaire was administered three months before the announcement of 
the Avinor corporatization process known as the Take-Off 05 project.  This questionnaire was 
then repeated at the mid-point of the Take-Off 05 implementation process in Nov/Dec 2004 after 
one of the ATCs had been closed down (Trondheim) and operations merged with a second ATCC 
in northern Norway (Bodø). In addition, during the timeframe that the second questionnaire was 
administered only three of the original four ATCCs remained, and a decision had been taken by 
the Avinor leadership to close a second ATCC (Oslo) to reduce the number of operative ATCCs 
in Norway from three to two.  This meant that the three remaining ATCCs in 2005 were 
experiencing three different phases of a common change process: two ATCCs had already been 
merged into one (Bodø), one ATCC knew that they would be closed (Oslo), and one ATCC knew 
that they would survive but would have to absorb the second closed unit (Stavanger). 
Participation in the leadership questionnaire at the respective units were: 
 
2002 
• Trondheim ATCC (n=30/48 for 63%) 
• Bodø ATCC (n=33/68 for 49%) 
• Stavanger ATCC (n=30/52 for 58%) 
• Oslo ATCC (n=62/120 for 52%) 
 
2004 
• Bodø ATCC (n=46/85 for 54%) 
• Stavanger ATCC (n=35/50 for 70%) 
• Oslo ATCC (n=64/103 for 62%) 
 
The leadership questionnaire results, combined with observations made during the longitudinal 
case study, were then used as a basis to design a semi-structured interview protocol to further 
investigate changes in individual attitudes and perceptions of four separate latent concepts 
considered important for understanding effects of organizational change on safety perceptions at 
the individual level over time.  The interviews focused specifically on perceptions and attitudes 
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related to: leadership commitment to safety, safety culture, attitudes towards organizational 
change, and individual perceptions of safety within Avinor’s three remaining ATCCs in 2005.  
These interviews were conducted just after the second leadership survey results were published 
and the HSLB questionnaire results were made public.  These interviews (10 at each site) were 
then transcribed into a common Norwegian language, and the responses were then individually 
coded using the NVIVO 7 software. The three remaining ATCCs were chosen as units of analysis 
as they were similar in size and function, and directly responsible for the safe and efficient flight 
operations covering 100% of Norway’s enroute civil aviation structure.   
 
The results from of the second leadership questionnaire were then compared to coded data from 
semi-structured interviews conducted at each of the remaining ATCCs in 2005 (Bodø, Oslo and 
Stavanger ATCCs) but also included former members of the Trondheim ATCC.  The triangulated 
leadership survey data sets were then used to verify changes in individual attitudes toward change 
and perceptions of the leadership’s commitment to safety using within-case and across-case 
analyses at two distinct points in time.  
 
The second quantitative data set used in the study was provided by the Norwegian Transportation 
Safety Board (HSLB) from the “Safety in Norwegian Civil Aviation during Change Processes” 
study (HSLB, 2005).  I was allowed to participate in the formulation of the study parameters, and 
was granted access to the results by both the HSLB and the Norwegian Ministry of Transport. 
This data set focused on how attitudes toward change, safety climate, and perceptions of safety 
had been affected by organizational changes that had taken place within the Norwegian civil 
aviation industry between 2000-2005, and consisted of over 4000 responses from eight distinct 
groupings within the civil aviation industry, including: pilots, air traffic controllers and ATC 
assistants, cabin crew, ground crew, maintenance personnel, engineers, the regulatory agency, 
and aviation leaders (HSLB, 2005). For this study, only responses from the air traffic controllers 
and Air Traffic Control assistants were used to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis on a 
conceptual structural equation model using Lisrel 8.7 software (Jöreskog et al., 1999).  The 
objective was to test hypotheses within a conceptual model describing relationships between the 
latent constructs mentioned above.   
 
Findings 
 
The results of the leadership questionnaire data were analyzed using within-case and across-case 
comparisons and supported with quotations from the coded interview data.  The findings showed 
that individual reactions to the change process, and correspondingly, the perceptions of the local 
leadership and local safety climate, varied predictably across units depending upon the respective 
phase of the change process each unit experienced.  These changes are depicted in Tables 2 and 3 
below. 
 
Insert Table 2 here. (Leadership group statistics) 
 
Insert Table 3 here. (Organizational climate group statistics) 
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However, the individual perceptions of the top leadership’s commitment were significantly 
similar across all cases and indicated a dramatic decrease across all units regardless of the phase 
of the change process experienced.  
 
Insert Table 4 here. (Top leader statistics) 
 
 
Conceptual Model 
 
The conceptual structural equation model used in the study was constructed using four latent 
concepts taken from the literature related to perceptions and attitudes toward change and safety, 
and reflected the findings from the literature review, the leadership questionnaires, and the semi-
structured interviews, and is depicted in Figure 2 below. In the model, I chose to use ordinal data 
instead of continuous data to accommodate for potential bias problems related to skewness and 
kurtosis.  This approach was used on the advice of Jöreskog (2004) where the order of the 
responses was meaningful, and the distance between responses was not particularly interesting.  
 
Insert Figure 2 here. (Conceptual Safety Measurement Model) 
 
The individual latent constructs were then defined using individual items from the HLSB 
questionnaire based on the literature.  The results are depicted in Figure 3 below: 
 
Insert Figure 3 here. (Conceptual Safety Measurement Model Results) 
 
The results show that there are strong positive direct correlations between the latent independent 
constructs (perception of leadership commitment, attitude toward change, and safety climate) and 
the main dependent latent construct (perception of safety). The results also show a moderate 
indirect influence of individual perceptions of leadership commitment on perceptions of safety 
through the intermediate latent construct attitude toward change.  The total positive effect on 
perception of safety by individual perceptions of leadership commitment is 0.72.  When this is 
combined with the results of the internal leadership questionnaires which show a significant 
decrease in individual perceptions of leadership commitment across all cases, it is clear that the 
potential effect on individual perceptions of safety based on the results of the structural equation 
model were significant, and in a negative direction.   
 
 
Discussion 
 
From the data collected during the Avinor study, it was clear that individual perceptions of safety 
were significantly reduced during the Take-of 05 process.  This is also reflected in the three data 
sets used in the study.  Yet, no changes in the classic safety measures of incident and accident 
reporting were recorded during the period as verified by the Norwegian Transportation Safety 
Board. 
 
I have argued that the safety literature is of little help in providing alternate means of measuring 
safety outcomes in high-risk industries that are also ultra safe during periods of deliberate 
organizational change. This is because most of the literature focuses either upon accident 
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causation or human failure after a catastrophic event, and not on safe system operations per se. 
This is influenced by the primary focus on accidents or near-accidents as abnormal events, and 
not the occurrence of undesired events as otherwise normal but unforeseen outcomes in properly 
functioning systems. This difference, though seemingly minor, significantly changes the way we 
look at system operations and system outcomes, particularly during system changes that lead to 
latent failures (Reason, 1990) that may provide important leading signals of impending disaster. 
Paying more attention to leading indicators or even the development of latent conditions that do 
not have immediate negative consequences can produce significant benefits for both 
understanding safe system operations and preventing systems from becoming unstable. But due 
to the current focus in civil aviation on incidents and accidents as primary safety measures, 
leading indicators signalling potential system deficiencies often go unnoticed, either due to a 
weak supporting organizational culture, or due to gradual acceptance of eroding safety 
conditions, also described as deviance (Vaughn, 1996). And artificial fixes, in the form of new 
rules and regulations, often only mask the underlying problem and do not correct system 
deficiencies that allow the failure in the first place. And though several positive initiatives for 
measuring certain aspects of organizational safety performance outside of traditional measures 
are emerging, these have not, as of yet, been combined into an integrated safety evaluation 
methodology. And more importantly, safety has not been studied as one aggregate measure 
consisting of three temporal phases within a larger strategic business system where safety 
competes with other organizational outcomes. 
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
This paper has addressed the paradox of measuring nothing happening as an indication of system 
safety as an outcome measure during organizational change processes in the ultra safe civil 
aviation industry. I have shown that this is, in fact, a well-documented problem within the safety 
literature (Weick, 1993a; Johnson, 2004), and has been observed by numerous studies of 
disastrous events in other social-technical industries as well (Perrow, 1984, Shrivastava, 1987; 
Weick,1993b.; Vaughn, 1996; Snook, 2002; Gehman, 2003), and is reflected in grounded theory 
from these events. But these studies, for the most part, focus on historical events, and it has been 
shown that there is a general lack of studies in vivo addressing the relationships between 
organizational change and safety outcomes due to decision-making processes, particularly in 
high-risk organizations that are also business-oriented.  
 
The literature reflects several academic schools of thought that are contributing significant new 
understanding to expanded areas of safety management study at both the individual and the 
organizational levels. And although these different schools of thought on safety are considered 
significant contributions to safety management that fill a gap between the lagging indications of 
traditional trial and error learning processes, and a more proactive approach of using risk analysis 
and other methods to detect potential safety implications of change, neither provides a 
satisfactory, holistic view of safety measurement for strategic leaders to use in decision-making.  
However, I also believe that a robust integrated safety management system that includes 
proactive, interactive and reactive measures using a combination of approaches in an integrated 
model provides a much better evaluation by which organizational leaders can make better 
informed choices in business management in high risk industries that are also ultra safe.  
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I have argued that though proactive and reactive measures provide some level of system safety 
understanding, it is the interactive phase of system operations where system safety is affected 
most in social-technical systems, and it is also in this area where safety has the greatest potential 
for improvement. Bridging the gap between the interactive phase, or more accurately the real-
time operations of a socio-technical system, to both the proactive and reactive phases is critical 
for improving system performance from a safety perspective, but also gives organizational 
leaders timely information and understanding of system performance during changing conditions 
that allows them to take more informed proactive decisions before undesired events take place.  
 
Though the integrated concept is not unique, incorporating the many supportive concepts into a 
holistic, functioning model that provides early detection of potential system weaknesses during 
change processes has received little study. And although safety management systems are 
currently in place throughout the civil aviation industry, the literature shows that what exists on 
paper is often not supported by underlying mechanisms, particular those connected to 
organizational culture and, more specifically, safety culture and climate (Johnson, 2004). And 
even though many safety tools are already available off-the-shelf such as: safety audits and 
evaluation techniques, a combination of mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, enforced 
recommendations, protocols, and rules and significant changes in the governance of systems and 
in corporate safety cultures (Amalberti, 2006: p. 254.) little research reflects how these tools are 
contributing to improving safety during change. And Kirwan (1998) adds that “the problem with 
just focusing on the policy and procedures, i.e. the ‘paper system’, is that whilst this is necessary, 
it is not sufficient. This paper system may represent the ‘designed intent’ of the safety 
management system but does not necessarily represent its operational realization” (p. 68).  And 
Kirwan also warns that “a good safety management system is necessary but not sufficient as there 
must also be commitment (from leadership) for implementation and application of sound safety 
management practice” (p. 74). 
 
Follow-on studies need to focus on how organizations approach and implement organizational 
change in high-risk industries, as well as, how these changes affect safety outcomes short of 
disastrous events. And this is particularly true in ultra-safe environment were incidents and 
accidents are rare by design.  
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Table 1 - Theoretical contributions to Safety Management Systems 
 
Theoretical background  Specialization  Authors 
              
 
High Reliability Organizations HRO structures    Rochlin et al., 1987 
         Roberts, 1990 
 
     Learning environments Weick and Roberts, 1993 
         Schulman, 1993 
         La Porte, 1996 
 
     Mindfulness   Weick, 1995 
         Weick et al., 1999 
         Weick and Sutcliffe,   
         2001:2006 
          
     Proactive Monitoring Ciavarelli, 2003 
         Ciavarelli and Crowson,  
         2004     
     
Resilience Engineering  Resilience   Hollnagel et al., 2006 
         Hale et al., 1998 
         Amalberti, 2001 
         Dekker, 2006 
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         Hale and Heijer, 2006 
         McDonald, 2006 
         Amalberti, 2006 
         Hollnagel and Sundström,  
         2006 
 
     Emergent systems  Woods, 2006 
         Dekker, 2006 
 
     Safety critical systems Levesen et al., 2006 
 
     Managerial resilience Flin, 2006 
         Sundström and Hollnagel,  
         2006 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 2 – Leadership group statistics 
 
 Trondheim 
2002 
Bodø 
2002 
Oslo 
2002 
Stavanger 
2002 
Bodø 
2004 
Oslo 
2004 
Stavanger 
2004 
Leader motivates 5.00 5.00 3.67 3.97 3.30 6.02 5.57 
Leader discussion 5.38 4.81 3.87 2.97 3.62 6.38 5.54 
Leader distributes 
information 
5.21 4.64 3.98 3.53 3.71 6.28 5.69 
Leader unity/ 
commitment 
5.03 4.34 3.56 3.37 3.20 6.37 6.06 
Trust in leader 6.20 5.84 4.26 4.37 4.17 6.64 6.46 
Leader 
performance 
3.38 3.48 3.54 2.37 1.48 1.13 1.89 
 
Table 3 – Organizational climate group statistics 
 
 Trondheim 
2002 
Bodø 
2002 
Oslo 
2002 
Stavanger 
2002 
Bodø 
2004 
Oslo 
2004 
Stavanger 
2004 
Personal conflict 2.03 2.64 3.35 4.80 4.69 2.60 2.69 
Work conditions 1.77 1.50 1.52 2.03 3.65 2.45 1.56 
Cooperation 
problems 
1.72 2.16 3.11 4.17 4.91 1.94 2.00 
Employees  
harassed 
1.45 1.94 2.81 4.63 3.48 1.41 2.74 
Working 
environment 
2.57 2.38 3.35 5.33 5.29 4.28 3.13 
Power struggles 1.62 2.06 3.49 3.53 4.00 2.08 1.97 
Poor motivation 2.87 2.30 3.00 3.33 4.26 5.16 2.46 
Job burden 2.70 3.52 2.76 3.80 5.11 4.66 3.49 
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Private life 
Low work morale 2.03 2.33 3.21 4.53 4.00 3.37 2.74 
Different opinions 2.52 3.59 3.81 4.14 3.98 2.35 2.80 
Pride in Avinor 4.67 5.38 4.46 4.00 2.57 1.56 2.94 
 
 
Table 4 - Top Leader Statistics 
 
 Trondheim 
2002 
Bodø 
2002 
Oslo 
2002 
Stavanger 
2002 
Bodø 
2004 
Oslo 
2004 
Stavanger 
2004 
Leader 
performance 
3.38 3.48 3.54 2.37 1.48 1.13 1.89 
 
Figure 2 – Conceptual measurement model 
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Figure 3 – Conceptual measurement model results 
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Leadership
Commitment
Safety
Climate
Attitudes
Change
Perceptions
Safety
Safety Measurement Model
0.64
0.54
-0.02
0.25
0.28
RMSEA = 0.030
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
